

Online Appendix for *Transmitting Rights:
International Organizations and the Diffusion of
Human Rights Practices*

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1 Upward vs. Downward Pressures

Table 1 below shows the results of re-estimating Model 1 from Table 3.1 of the book using subsets of the data in which each state's *IGO Context* is either (1) higher than its *PIR Score*; (2) lower than its *PIR Score*; (3) rising; or (4) falling. See the discussion beginning on page ?? for full details.

Table 1: Modeling upward and downward pressures.

	All data	Higher	Lower	Rising	Falling
IGO Context	0.22 (0.00)	0.60 (0.00)	0.34 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.39 (0.00)
GDP per capita (log)	0.09 (0.00)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.00)	0.11 (0.00)	0.02 (0.42)
Regime Durability	0.00 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.24)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.65)	0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.22)	-0.00 (0.21)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.28)
Democracy	0.02 (0.00)	0.00 (0.96)	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)
Trade Dependence	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.67)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
FDI Dependence	0.00 (0.95)	-0.01 (0.23)	0.00 (0.47)	0.00 (0.63)	-0.00 (0.81)
Lagged DV	0.67 (0.00)	0.41 (0.00)	0.33 (0.00)	0.66 (0.00)	0.68 (0.00)

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Table 1: (continued from the previous page)

	All data	Higher	Lower	Rising	Falling
Conflict	-0.67 (0.00)	-0.57 (0.00)	0.10 (0.33)	-0.86 (0.00)	-0.49 (0.00)
N	3063	1405	1658	1439	1473
AIC	9773.47	4151.25	3742.65	4564.18	4726.22

2 Expanded models of physical integrity rights

Table 2 below shows how the results for physical integrity rights presented in Table 3.1 of the book differ once I include the *Neighborhood Effect* and *Cultural Similarity* variables in the same model.

Table 2: Models of Physical Integrity Rights with additional spatial lags. Model 1 is a simple OLS model; Model 2 includes country random effects; Model 3 includes both country and year random effects; and Model 4 is an ordered probit model. P-values are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
IGO Context	0.25 (0.00)	0.38 (0.00)	0.56 (0.00)	0.28 (0.00)
Neighborhood Effect	0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.87)	0.06 (0.01)
Cultural Similarity	-0.15 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.50)	-0.15 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.07 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)
Regime Durability	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.97)	0.00 (0.60)	0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.04)

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Table 2: (continued from the previous page)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Democracy	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.03 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)
Trade Dependence	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
FDI Dependence	0.00 (0.74)	0.00 (0.85)	0.00 (0.28)	0.00 (0.55)
Conflict	-0.68 (0.00)	-0.64 (0.00)	-0.67 (0.00)	-0.48 (0.00)
Lagged DV	0.67 (0.00)	0.51 (0.00)	0.49 (0.00)	0.56 (0.00)
N	3044	3044	3044	3044
AIC	9703.62	9711.84	9642.17	9149.9

3 Including a dummy variable for new democracies

Table 3 below shows how the results for physical integrity rights presented in Table 3.1 of the book differ once I include a dummy variable for new democracies. The construction of this variable is described on page ?? of Chapter 5. As the results in the table show, the estimated effect of the key independent variable, *IGO Context*, remains similar in all four models.

Table 3: Including a new democracy dummy variable in the models of Physical Integrity Rights. Model 1 is a simple OLS model; Model 2 includes country random effects; Model 3 includes both country and year random effects; and Model 4 is an ordered probit model. P-values are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
IGO Context	0.25 (0.00)	0.33 (0.00)	0.54 (0.00)	0.30 (0.00)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.09 (0.00)	0.17 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)
Regime Durability	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.78)	0.00 (0.49)	0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.22)	-0.00 (0.03)
Democracy	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.03 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)
Trade Dependence	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)

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Table 3: (continued from the previous page)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
FDI Dependence	0.00 (0.83)	0.00 (0.88)	0.00 (0.34)	0.00 (0.64)
Lagged DV	0.67 (0.00)	0.50 (0.00)	0.48 (0.00)	0.56 (0.00)
Conflict	-0.68 (0.00)	-0.65 (0.00)	-0.68 (0.00)	-0.48 (0.00)
New Democracy	0.17 (0.03)	0.15 (0.06)	0.10 (0.20)	0.14 (0.04)
N	2937	2937	2937	2937
AIC	9370.02	9361.98	9302.41	8837.61

4 Ordered probit model of women's rights

Table 4 below reproduces Table 5.1 of the book while using an ordered probit model to estimate the *Women's Rights* model. (See the discussion in Section ??.)

Table 4: Re-estimating Table ?? using an ordered probit model of *Women's Rights*. (The first column is unaffected.)

	Gay Rights	Women's Rights
IGO Context	11.45 (0.00)	0.41 (0.00)
GDP per capita	0.27 (0.21)	0.03 (0.13)
Polity 2	0.08 (0.07)	0.01 (0.01)
New Democracy	0.50 (0.33)	-0.08 (0.29)
Regime Durability	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.51)	-0.00 (0.75)
Trade Dependence	-0.01 (0.27)	0.00 (0.78)
FDI Dependence	0.02 (0.60)	0.00 (0.94)

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Table 4: (continued from the previous page)

	Gay Rights	Women's Rights
Conflict	-0.58 (0.36)	-0.18 (0.00)
Lagged DV		1.20 (0.00)
Threshold 0-1		1.98 (0.00)
Threshold 1-2		3.21 (0.00)
Threshold 2-3		4.46 (0.00)
Threshold 3-4		5.80 (0.00)
Threshold 4-5		7.93 (0.00)
Threshold 5-6		8.75 (0.00)
Threshold 6-7		10.66 (0.00)
Threshold 7-8		11.94 (0.00)

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Table 4: (continued from the previous page)

	Gay Rights	Women's Rights
Threshold 8-9		13.41 (0.00)
N	1841	2496
AIC	250.82	5161.43

5 Additional Robustness Tests for Gay Rights Model

Table 5 below shows the effect on the of including controls for a common law tradition and for the presence of human rights INGOs in the model of gay rights.

Table 5: Models of gay rights with additional control variables.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
IGO Context	11.45 (0.00)	6.60 (0.04)	13.94 (0.00)	9.28 (0.01)
GDP per capita	0.27 (0.21)	0.28 (0.22)	0.13 (0.57)	0.18 (0.44)
Polity 2	0.08 (0.07)	0.12 (0.01)	0.09 (0.03)	0.13 (0.00)
New Democracy	0.50 (0.33)	0.11 (0.84)	0.31 (0.56)	-0.04 (0.94)
Regime Durability	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.70)	-0.01 (0.15)	0.00 (0.91)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.51)	-0.00 (0.41)	-0.00 (0.60)	-0.00 (0.54)
Trade Dependence	-0.01 (0.27)	-0.00 (0.58)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.00 (0.62)
FDI Dependence	0.02 (0.60)	0.01 (0.61)	0.02 (0.45)	0.02 (0.47)

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Table 5: (continued from the previous page)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Conflict	-0.58 (0.36)	-0.47 (0.47)	-0.59 (0.36)	-0.51 (0.44)
Common Law		-1.80 (0.01)		-1.84 (0.01)
HR INGOs			-0.04 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.13)
N	1841	1813	1726	1702
AIC	250.82	239.88	245.24	235.09

6 Expanded models of gay rights and women's rights

Table 6 below reproduces Table 5.1 of the book while including additional covariates aimed to capture geographic and cultural forms of diffusion. (See the discussion in Section ??.)

Table 6: Models of gay rights and women's rights.

	Gay Rights	Women's Rights
IGO Context	15.00 (0.00)	0.35 (0.00)
GDP per capita	0.29 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.35)
Polity 2	0.08 (0.07)	0.01 (0.02)
New Democracy	0.53 (0.31)	-0.06 (0.24)
Regime Durability	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.41)	-0.00 (0.77)
Trade Dependence	-0.01 (0.28)	0.00 (0.20)
FDI Dependence	0.02 (0.64)	0.00 (0.61)

(table continues on next page)

Table 6: (continued from the previous page)

	Gay Rights	Women's Rights
Conflict	-0.77 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.00)
Neighborhood Effect	-1.20 (0.28)	0.05 (0.04)
Cultural Similarity	-1.24 (0.56)	0.05 (0.12)
Global Norm	0.01 (0.62)	-0.49 (0.00)
Lagged DV		0.79 (0.00)
N	1841	2477
AIC	254.73	5383.4

7 Testing sender, IGO and receiver effects for gay rights and women's rights

Figure 1 below shows how the size and statistical significance of the *IGO Context* variable in the gay rights model changes as a function of applying the different weighting schemes used in Chapter 4. Figure 2 below shows the analogous results for the women's rights model.

Figure 3 shows how the estimated effect of *IGO Context* in the gay rights model is moderated by various domestic covariates.




Figure 1: Effects of varying the weighting scheme used to construct *IGO Context* in the models of gay rights. The asterisk (*) identifies models whose out-of-sample predictive power exceeds that of the baseline (unweighted) model.




Figure 2: Effects of varying the weighting scheme used to construct *IGO Context* in the models of women's rights. The asterisk (*) identifies models whose out-of-sample predictive power exceeds that of the baseline (unweighted) model.




Figure 3: Results for the gay rights model of interacting *IGO Context* with various characteristics of the “receiving” state. (Note that the y-axis is expressed in terms of the linear predictor, not the predicted value of the response variable.)




Figure 4: Results for the women’s rights model of interacting *IGO Context* with various characteristics of the “receiving” state.

8 Descriptive statistics on departures from IGOs

Table 7 below shows the states that departed during the 1991-2000 period from a randomly-selected sample of 10 IGOs. As was reported in Table 6.1 of the book, most of these departures are due to the withdrawal of states that ceased to exist following the end of the Cold War. The only exception is the stream of departures from the International Customs Tariffs Bureau, an organization established in 1890 to translate and publish customs tariffs. Its membership has been undergoing a steady decline since the early 1980s.

Table 7: States that leave from IGOs in the period 1990-2000.

IGO	Leavers, 1990-2000
African Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises	None
International Bureau of Weights and Measures	East Germany (1991); West Germany (1991); Czechoslovakia (1993)
Commonwealth	None
European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease	West Germany (1991); Czechoslovakia (1993)
International Mobile Satellite Organization	East Germany (1991); West Germany (1991); Czechoslovakia (1993); Yugoslavia (1993); Georgia (1995)
International Organization for Migration	West Germany (1991)
International Customs Tariffs Bureau	West Germany (1991); Czechoslovakia (1993); Czech Republic (1996); Vietnam (1996); Yugoslavia (1996); Ivory Coast (1997); Mexico (1997); Netherlands (1997), Philippines (1997); United Kingdom (1997); Portugal (1999)
Postal Union of the Americas, Spain and Portugal	None
South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme	None
South Investment, Trade and Technological Data Exchange Centre	None

9 Modeling the formation of IGO ties

Figure 5 shows the results of a model of *IGO Flows* that includes a control for the existing “stock” of IGO ties. See the discussion at page ??.




Figure 5: Point estimates and 95% credible intervals of the estimates of each coefficient in the year-specific models. The red horizontal lines represent a coefficient estimate of zero.

10 Modeling the formation of IGO ties among HR IGOs only




Figure 6: Models based upon data on the human rights IGOs only.

11 Placebo Tests

The following figures compare the estimated effect of *IGO Context* in the original model with that obtained using data on “placebo” IGOs. In the first set of trials (shown in Figure 7), I generated placebo IGOs by randomly assigning states to each of the existing IGOs in the dataset, subject to the constraint that the number of members (N) of each IGO equals the true number of members of that organization. (In doing so, I kept the membership profile unchanged throughout the time period.)

In the second set of trials (Figure 8), I added the additional constraint that the N members of each IGO had to be its N closest states (based on distances between capital cities).




Figure 7: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals around the coefficient of *IGO Context* in models of physical integrity rights. The result shown in the top row represents that obtained using the real IGO data, whereas the results in the lower rows represent the coefficient estimates obtained by randomly assigning states to “placebo IGOs.”




Figure 8: In this case, the “placebo IGOs” have been created by randomly assigning states only the more geographically proximate states to each placebo IGO.